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Abstract
This paper explores how government preferences affect the choices of capital tax rates
in the presence of tax competition. We develop a model in which governments, differentiating in their preferences for economic development and regional equality, compete
for mobile capital over corporation taxes. The key prediction of the model, borne out
in data from OECD countries over the years 1990-2007, is that countries emphasizing
more on economic development tend to choose lower level of corporate income tax rates
than the counterparts that stressing more on regional equality. Our result contributes
to the tax competition literature by advancing a new element, heterogeneous government preferences, as another potential source of asymmetric tax policy responses that
is widely observed across countries.
Keywords: Tax competition; heterogeneous government preferences; asymmetric tax
rates
JEL Classifications: H25, R11, R50
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1 Introduction
A critical issue of study in the tax competition literature is how competition among government units for capital influences their choices of tax policy. The standard argument
in the literature, which originates in the fundamental work of Wilson (1986) and Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), is that competition through taxation leads to inefficiently low tax
rates.1 Although this classic view provides valuable insights into the nature of competition
among governments, its symmetric implication for all the units in the economy may hide the
potential for intergovernmental conflict and so fail to explain the actual asymmetric policy
responses of governments as we observe in some regions of the world. For instance, despite
the increasing mobility of capital and competitive pressure on the governments in the European Union, the variation of effective average capital tax rates in the members remains
high in the year 2007, ranging from 8.8% in Bulgaria to 35.5% in Germany (Elschner and
Vanborren, 2009).2 Other studies also reveal that, although tax rates on capital have fallen
substantially since the early 1980s, some countries have continued to tax at higher rates
than others (e.g. Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Zissimos and
Wooders, 2008). Given this context, a natural question is to ask how can we explain these
cross-country differences in tax policy responses when fundamentally all governments face
the same incentives to attract mobile capital through corporation taxes.
An important branch of the current literature focused on explaining this asymmetric
outcome of tax competition concentrates mainly on the exogenously given asymmetries between the competing government units, such as country size and government efficiency. In
particular, Bucovetsky (1991); Wilson (1991) and Bucovetsky and Haufler (2007) analyze
asymmetric tax competition between two countries of different size.3 They show that the
1

Numerous subsequent works have extended and refined this argument in a variety of directions; see
Wilson (1999), Wilson and Wildasin (2004), and de Mello (2008) for excellent surveys on the tax competition
literature. However, Becker and Runkel (2012) show that in the presence of transport cost of trade, the
inefficiency of tax competition can be restored.
2
Most of the countries are distributed around an average of 22.3%.
3
Kächelein (2014) examines a similar issue but under the context of tax competition among small jurisdictions within the metropolitan areas, where labor is assumed to be a second mobile factor. He shows that
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small country tends to set lower tax rates than the large country in equilibrium, since the
former has the higher elasticity of capital supply.4 Dharmapala and Hines (2009) confirm this
prediction by providing empirical evidence that most tax havens tend to be small, though
they attribute the reason to the quality of governance. From a different angle, Ivanyna (2010)
shows that if the governments of the competing countries are different in their efficiency (i.e.
one of them is able to produce more public good for the same revenue), then in equilibrium
the more efficient government sets the higher tax rate and also has higher public infrastructure investment which reduces the cost of firms. Less efficient governments, in contrast,
choose to attract the firms with lower taxes and lower level of public infrastructure.5
Another branch of literature argues that the asymmetric policy responses may even be
obtained for ex ante symmetric countries as a consequence of increasing returns to scale or agglomeration economies. Papers by Kind et al. (2000); Ludema and Wooton (2000); Baldwin
and Krugman (2004) and Bucovetsky (2005) point to the fact that industrial concentration generates “agglomeration rent”, which provides industrialized nations an advantage to
extract some of these rents through higher taxation. Furthermore, Zissimos and Wooders
(2008) show that even without agglomeration economies, variation in the extent to which
firms can use public goods to reduce costs yields the asymmetric outcome that the core
nations would set a higher tax rate and provide a higher level of public infrastructure than
the periphery nations.
the secondary fiscal externality implied by labor mobility gives rise to the size-related tax differentials.
4
Country size is measured by the population endowment in these studies. However, this result is shown
to be quite consistent with the other measures of country size. For example, Marceau et al. (2010) model
the country size as their stocks of immobile capital, and obtain a similar result that only the two smallest
countries compete for mobile capital by reducing their tax rates; the rest are content to maximize the
revenues obtained from the immobile capital. Haufler and Wooton (1999) also consider competition between
two countries of unequal size with trade barriers and conclude that the large country wins the game due to
the larger market it possesses.
5
Cai and Treisman (2005) explain the asymmetric response of expenditure policy across-country by
the heterogeneity of initial endowments. They argue that if regions or countries differ markedly in initial
endowments, symmetric equilibria of fiscal competition will not exist, and as a matter of fact, only wellendowed regions will engage in competition for capital and end up with more business-friendly expenditure
policies. Poorly-endowed units, in anticipating losing the game, will simply give up on competition and turn
to less business-friendly expenditure policies. Building on a similar setup, Liu (2013) provides a possible
solution to this issue through the use of fiscal equalization schemes.
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In this paper we explore a different explanation for the asymmetric outcome of tax
competition. The vast majority of current studies assume that all the competing units
have exactly the same preferences, in particular, the same utility functions.6 However,
this assumption is unlikely to hold for most real world cases. Relaxing this assumption
and giving alternative, empirical plausible assumptions on the heterogeneity of government
preferences, this paper seeks to provide another possible explanation for the cross-country
differences in the choices of tax policy under the context of tax competition. We argue that,
in the presence of heterogeneity in countries’ development levels, cultural beliefs, governance
regimes and even the viewpoint of politicians, it is likely that governments on behalf of
the voters or politicians themselves may pursue different social objectives,7 even when they
face the same incentives for competing capital. For simplicity, we explore the effects of the
heterogeneous preferences in a tax competition model where government units only face
different tradeoffs between pursuing economic development and regional equality.8 We show
that in equilibrium, governments emphasizing more on economic development tend to choose
a lower level of corporate income tax rate than the counterparts stressing more on regional
equality. This theoretical prediction is then tested and confirmed by data from OECD
countries for the years 1990-2007. The empirical results are also shown to be robust across
alternative measures of corporate income tax rates and government preferences, and also
6

In these studies, the governments involved are assumed symmetrically to act as either benevolent or
Leviathan, or some combination of the two. Bucovetsky et al. (1998) consider a federation in which local
jurisdictions are identical in every respect, except their inhabitant’s tastes for public spending. They show
that in the absence of any corrective action by the federal government, the tax rate levied in the hightaste jurisdictions is higher than in the low-taste one. Koethenbuerger (2014) analyzes how homogenous
jurisdictions versus heterogeneous jurisdictions in terms of their preferences for attracting different type of
households shape their competitive policies for migrants, particularly taxes and transfers policies. However,
these are not what we consider in this paper.
7
For instance, an initial poor country may have relatively more incentives than the rich one to promote
economic development rather than reduce income inequality. In a well-known paper, Alesina and Angeletos
(2005b) show how a country’s social belief of fairness would affect its preference in choosing tax and especially
redistribution policy. They claim that: “If a society believes that individual effort determines income, and
that all have a right to enjoy the fruits of their effort, it will choose low redistribution and low taxes;... If
instead, a society believes that luck, birth, connections, and/or corruption determine wealth, it will levy
high taxes.”(p.960)
8
Upon this assumption, we assume that economic development and regional equality are the two main
objectives of all the competing units. In a related study, Matsumoto (2008) shows how capital tax competition
may lead to inefficient mix of transfer and development policies in the presence of regional income disparity.
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across subsample of countries.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section
3 develops the empirical methodology and discusses the measurements of our key variables
of interest and data sources. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Finally, section 5
concludes.

2 The Model
Consider an economy that is divided into N countries, indexed by i, each of which has a
central government. Each country i is composed of two asymmetric regions A and B, denoted by j. It is assumed that each region has an immobile (representative) resident, who
owns identical endowments with fixed amounts of immobile factor (e.g., land or labor) L̄
and fixed amounts of mobile capital K̄.9 Within each country, the two types of regions are
heterogeneous with respect to their development level, and we label them as the “active”
region A and the “inactive” region B. The former is assumed to have a relatively higher
marginal productivity of capital, because of its higher development level. As a result, production is only conducted in the active region of the country after the location of capital
is decided. The inactive region shares the production outcome through the income received
from its capital stock and, also from a transfer from the central government. The transfer
in turn is financed with a tax on capital. In addition, the countries differ in their exogenous
preferences, by which we mean that the central governments care about two objectives—
overall economic development and equality in the distribution of resident incomes between
the two regions—with different weights. In this setting, the central government chooses the
rate of the source-based unit tax ti levied on mobile capital to influence the allocation of
capital across countries. Finally, the transfer policy gi is introduced in the model to adjust
regional incomes and also to balance the budget of the central government.

9

Capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile across both regions and countries.
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The production in country i is given by the function Fi (Ki , Li ),10 where Ki is the amount
of mobile capital and Li is the amount of a fixed production factor such as labor or land. For
analytical convenience the fixed factor is normalized to unity and the production function can
be rewritten as Fi (Ki ), which is increasing, twice continuously differentiable concave in the
level of capital Ki , i.e.

∂Fi
∂Ki

>0>

∂ 2 Fi
.
∂Ki2

More precisely, following Bucovetsky (1991); Grazzini

and Van Ypersele (2003); Hindriks et al. (2008); Liu and Martinez-Vazquez (2013), we assume
a quadratic specification of the production, which is well behaved over its increasing range
and allows us to introduce several simplifications. Specifically, the production function is
given by,

Fi (Ki ) = αKi −

β 2
K
2 i

(1)

where β is the rate of decline of the marginal product of capital with the amount of capital
invested in the country; technology parameter α is assumed to be sufficient large relative to
β, which ensures a positive level of production and the standard properties of the production
function.
Since capital is perfectly mobile across regions and countries, profit maximization implies
that the net return of capital in every country must be equalized,
∂Fi
− ti = ρ, for all i
∂Ki

(2)

where ρ is the cross-country economy-wide net return to capital. Since we assume that
each country is small relative to the whole economy, then ρ is fixed across countries. With
equation (1), we can solve (2) for the capital allocated in country i, to obtain,

Ki =

α − ti − ρ
β

10

(3)

Again, it is noted that production in a country is assumed to be conducted in the active region of the
country only.
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As indicated, capital flows to country i are determined by the country’s tax policy along
with other exogenous factors. Once capital is allocated across countries, production takes
place in the active region of the each country. Residents in the active regions earn income
from both the immobile factor and the capital stock. In the inactive region where production
does not occur, residents can earn only capital income through investing their own capital
stock in outside markets. Thus, the income gap between the two regions emerges as a result
of capital mobility. To reduce regional income disparity, the central government transfers an
amount of income gi to the inactive region. Resident’s income in each region of country i is
given by,11


 yiA = Fi (Ki ) − (ρ + ti )Ki + ρK̄ (Active region)

 yiB = ρK̄ + gi
(Inactive region)

(4)

where Fi (Ki ) − (ρ + ti )Ki is the immobile factor income of the residents in active region
where production occurs. ρK̄ is the income from local ownership of capital in both active
and inactive regions. Due to the concern for fairness, we further assume that even with
the transfer policy, residents in the active region have no less income than residents in the
inactive region, i.e. yiA > yiB . Under capital-tax financing, the budget constraint of the
central government is simply,

ti Ki = gi

(5)

To complete the model, we assume the objectives of the central government are to pursue
overall economic development, regional equality, or some combination of the two. More
specifically, the social welfare function (of the central government) Wi is a function of Fi , the
aggregate product in the country, and |yiA − yiB | = yiA − yiB , the income disparity between
the two regions. In order to capture government’s preference for economic development
relative to regional equality in a simple way, we assume that Wi takes a linear form,
11

This setting is similar to that in Matsumoto (2008).
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Wi = λi Fi − (yiA − yiB )

(6)

where the negative sign attached to the second term reflects the central government’s avoidance of regional income disparity in the sense that a higher level of regional income inequality reduces the central government’s utility; the parameter, λi > 0, attached to the
aggregate outputs Fi , measures the government’s preference for economic development relative to regional equality. Thus, the higher the value of λi , the more the central government
is concerned about economic development vis-à-vis regional equality.
The problem of each central government is to choose its capital tax rate ti so as to
maximize its objective function (6), subject to its budget constraint (5) and the resident’s
income determination rules specified in (4). The first order conditions (FOCs) gives,
ti λi
∂Wi
= 2Ki − − (ρ + ti ) = 0
∂ti
β
β

(7)

Using equations (3) and (7), we can obtain country i’s optimal tax rate as a function of
its preferences over economic development and regional equality,

t∗i =

−λi ρ + 2α − 2ρ
3 + λi

Equation (8) presents the property that

∂t∗i
λi

(8)

< 0, which immediately gives the following

result.
Proposition 1 Countries with a higher preference for economic development in relative to
regional equality λi tend to select a lower level of capital income tax rate t∗i .
The intuition of this result is straightforward and practically meaningful. It clearly
indicates that for countries emphasizing more on economic development, selecting a lower
rate of capital income tax would be optimal as it increases marginal product of capital and
results in attracting more mobile capital for economic development. Equally importantly, this
7

theoretical exercise conveys a clear message that the asymmetry of government preferences
does contribute to a source of generating asymmetric responses of tax policy across countries.
In the subsequent sections, we resort to the data from OECD countries for empirical evidence.

3 Empirical Methodology and Data
Our main empirical strategy is to test the theoretical prediction that is explicitly summarized
in Proposition 1, using a panel data set of 28 OECD countries over the period 1990-2007.
This selection of country sample and observation period is based on the data availability of
our main variables of interest including corporate income tax rates and the measurement of
government preferences, which is discussed with more details in subsection 3.3.

3.1 Specification
In order to be consistent with the tax competition theory, our empirical model builds on a
dynamic spatial lag specification in the most general form that has been widely employed in
the previous empirical research on tax competition (e.g. Devereux et al., 2008; Jacobs et al.,
2010; Klemm and Van Parys, 2012; Liu and Martinez-Vazquez, 2013).

τit = aτit−1 + bτ−it + β1 Pit + Xit γ1 + ηi + ttt + εit

(9)

where the dependent variable τit is the corporate income tax rate of country i in year t; Pit is
our measure of government preferences for economic development relative to regional equality
of country i in year t; τit−1 is a one period time-lagged dependent variable, which is included
to account for the high degree of persistence in tax policies; τ−it denotes the weighted average
P
of all other countries j’s corporate income tax rates in year t, i.e. τ−it = j6=i wij τjt , which is
introduced to capture the spatial dependence and so the tax competition pattern underlined
by the theory. Following the standard practice of the spatial econometrics literature, we rely
on geographic criteria to define the exogenously weights as the inverse of distance between
8

the countries (dij ) and they are normalized so that the summation of all weights equal to 1,
i.e. wij =

d
P ij ;
j dij

ηi is country-specific fixed effects capturing the unobserved heterogeneity

across countries that are constant over time, while ttt is a linear time trend.12
As control variables, Xit includes a set of factors that influence tax rate based on existing
theoretical and empirical literature. This leads to the inclusion of real GDP per capita,
openness, government consumption, unemployment rate, urban population share, proportion
of young population, and proportion of old population, election and party affiliation. Real
GDP per capita serves as a measure of income; higher incomes are generally related to
stronger demand for public services, which may ultimately affect a country’s tax policies.
Openness, which is calculated as the ratio of total trades (import plus export) to GDP, aims
to capture the exposure of a country to trade and competition for capital. Government
consumption as a percentage of GDP is included to account for the revenue need of the
government. Unemployment rate is used to measure the impact of the business cycle on tax
setting behavior of governments. A series of demographic characteristics including urban
population share, proportions of young and old population serve to characterize a country’s
special needs for public policies. Finally, drawing on Devereux et al. (2008) and Foucault
et al. (2008), we also include election and party affiliation to capture the potential effects of
political factors. Election is a dummy variable for an election year, which takes the value
1 for each presidential election year of the country and 0 otherwise; partisan affiliation is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the party of government is to the left of centre and
0 otherwise. Finally, all control variables, excepting the dummy variables, are lagged by one
period to avoid any endogeneity bias.

3.2 Estimation
In order to estimate specification (9) unbiasedly and efficiently, two critical endogeneity
issues have to be addressed. First, the lagged dependent variable is endogenous since it is
12

See the subsequent subsection for a discussion on the reason to include time trend instead of time
dummies in the specification.
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correlated with the country fixed effects in the composite error term (ηi + εit ), which yields
biased and inconsistent results if OLS or fixed effect estimators are applied (Nickell, 1981).
Second, tax policies of the competitors enter contemporaneously, so that the competitors’
tax decisions are endogenous and correlated with the error term (εit ). OLS yields a biased
estimate of parameter ρ (Anselin, 1988).13
To circumvent all these problems, we employ the system GMM estimator developed by
Blundell and Bond (1998), that has been used quite often in the recent studies on tax competition with dynamic features (Foucault et al., 2008; Ghinamo et al., 2010; Klemm and
Van Parys, 2012). This estimator combines the moment conditions from both the firstdifferenced equation of the estimating equation and the estimating equation in levels, and
then estimates the parameters by GMM.14 In addition, following the standard spatial econometrics literature (Kelejian and Robinson, 1993; Kelejian and Prucha, 1998), we also use
the competitors’ weighted government preferences, weighted real GDP per capita, weighted
openness, weighted government consumption, weighted unemployment rate, weighted urban
population share, weighted proportion of young population, and weighted proportion of old
population as extra exogenous instruments for the spatial lag variable (τ−it ) in specification
(9).15
The overall validity of the instruments used in the regressions as well as the serial correlation in the residuals are evaluated by the Sargan test (or overidentifying restriction test) and
the Arellano and Bond (1991) test respectively. The former statistic tests the null hypothesis
that the instruments are not correlated with the residuals, while the latter tests the presence
of auto-correlation in the residuals.16 Both statistics are necessary to confirm the validity of
13

This second endogeneity is a typical issue in the spatial econometrics literature. Two conventional
approaches for getting consistent estimates of the spatial parameter are suggested in the literature. The
first approach is to use instrumental variables (Anselin, 1988). An alternative approach is to rely on the
maximum likelihood (See Brueckner, 2003, for more discussion). Although both approaches yield consistent
estimate of spatial parameter, the latter method is generally challenging in computation.
14
In dealing with the endogenous variables, the system GMM estimator uses lagged levels to instrument
the endogenous differences and lagged first differences to instrument levels.
15
The weights are constructed in the same way as the ones we discussed previously.
16
Given the structure of the first-differences equation in the system GMM estimator, the first order
correlation in the residuals is usually expected, but the second order correlation in the residuals should be
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the instruments used.
Ideally, one would also include time dummies in the specification to prevent the most
likely form of cross-state correlation, contemporaneous correlation. However, it generates
two problems in my context. Due to the large amount of instruments created by the system
GMM estimator together with the external instruments, adding time dummies may weaken
the Sargan test and overfit the endogenous variable (Roodman, 2009a,b). Additionally,
Devereux et al. (2008) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012) point out that the inclusion of
time dummies in a model with spatial lag variables results in a possible multicollinearity
issue among the spatial lag variables and the time dummies,17 which makes it hard to
identify the true impact of each variable. Therefore, following the suggestion by Devereux
et al. (2008) and Klemm and Van Parys (2012), we add a linear time trend variable that
captures common trend for all states, instead of using time dummies.

3.3 Variables and Data
The data we use in this paper covers 28 OECD countries over the period 1990-2007. In this
subsection, we explain our dataset in further detail, with a special focus on the measurements
of our dependent variables and government preferences.
To begin with, the corporate income tax rate of country i in year t (τit ) is measured
by both the statutory corporate income tax rate (SCIT) and the effective average tax rate
(EATR). The former measure, defined as the top statutory tax rate including local profit
taxes, is conceptually in line with the tax tool discussed in the standard tax competition
models of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986) and one that has also been
used in some of the recent empirical studies of tax competition (e.g. Devereux et al., 2008;
Klemm and Van Parys, 2012). However, due to the complexity and variety of tax exemptions,
deductions and credits existing in the tax system, it is generally believed that the information
avoided for a valid specification.
17
The reason here is that the inclusion of time dummies is equivalent to adding the average value of the
dependent variable in each year, which by its nature is highly correlated with the spatial lag variables.
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derived from the SCIT is not sufficient to reflect the actual tax burden of capital, and
so tax competition should not only be driven by statutory tax rate but also by tax base
adjustments. In view of this, the concept of EATR, as proposed by Devereux and Griffith
(1998) and Devereux and Griffith (2003), is claimed to be a better measure for analyzing the
impact of taxation on investment behavior. Because this measure, based on forward-looking
concepts, calculates the effective tax burden for hypothetical further investment projects over
the assumed life of the project using the statutory features of the tax regimes, which include
the statutory tax rate, capital allowances, the treatment of foreign source income and others
(Commission, 2001).18 Since it is in principle the relevant rate for analyzing discrete location
choices of investment, this measure has become widely used in recent empirical studies of
tax competition and in many other studies that related to foreign investment location (e.g.
Devereux et al., 2002; Lahrèche-Révil, 2005; Winner, 2005; Loretz, 2008; Ivanyna, 2010).
Thus, we use the EATR as our primary measure of capital income tax rates and use the
SCIT as an alternative for robustness checks. Data on both the SCIT and the EATR are
provided by Loretz (2008), who updated and extended the version of the Devereux et al.
(2002) dataset to include more countries and years.19
The measurement of our key variable of interest, government preferences Pit , turns out to
be a much more challenging task in this paper since it is not directly observable. Theoretical
model solves this issue in a simple way by restricting government preferences to two important
dimensions: economic development and regional equality. In order to be consistent with
this assumption, it is ideally to come up with an appropriate proxy that is able to reflect
governments’ relatively attitude toward both dimensions at the same time. As a main proxy
we utilize interview data on “public perception of income equality” taken from both the
European Values Survey (EVS) the World Values Survey (WVS) to achieve this goal.20
18

See Devereux and Griffith (1998) and Devereux and Griffith (2003) for a detailed discussion of the
methodology.
19
See Devereux et al. (2002) and Loretz (2008) for more information.
20
Both the EVS and the WVS are cross-country projects that aim to collect comparative survey data on
social values and belief system. Their samples are based on representative national samples of at least 1000
individuals in each country. Because of their comprehensivity in providing social and economic beliefs, they
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More specifically, we measure government preferences for economic development relative
to regional equality by using respondents’ answers to the following survey question that
contains two conflicting statements from both the EVS and the WVS: “incomes should be
made more equal” and “we need large income differences as incentives”. As it self explains,
the first statement asks for respondents’ opinions on income inequality, while the second
statement approximately emphasizes on their views of using income inequality as incentive
for economic development. It is therefore the merit of the survey question in capturing both
dimensions of our interest that makes it an arguably good proxy for government preferences.
The answers are coded 1 to 10, with 1 indicating complete agreement with the first statement
and so favoring regional equality, and 10 representing complete agreement with the second
statement and so favoring economic development. Other numbers in between reflect the
respondent’s belief on the relative importance of the two issues. Since this survey question
is included in various waves of both the EVS and the WVS with exactly the same coding for
answers,21 and given the observation that both surveys cover quite different sets of country
sample, we thereby integrate all available waves of the two surveys together in order to make
our sample size as large as possible.22 Finally, the final value for government preferences in
each country for each year is calculated from the following two steps of aggregation. First, we
recode the answer values on a scale 0 to 1, and take the mean national value of all individual
respondents in the same country as a proxy for government preferences in that country for
the period covered in that particular wave. Next, basing on different waves covered in the
same decade (i.e. 1990-1999; 2000-2007) we calculate each country the average value of
government preferences over a decade, and then employ this average value as the values for
each year in that decade. The reasons for doing so is to maximize the number of observations,
have become widely used sources in recent empirical literature on examining the impacts of public belief on
government policies and economic outcomes (Fong, 2001; Guiso et al., 2003; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005b,a;
Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Strieborny, 2013)
21
There are five waves of the WVS in total including 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1994-1999, 1999-2004, and
2005-2007; and four waves of the EVS in total including 1981-1984, 1990-1993, 1999-2001, and 2008-2010.
22
The five waves WVS data-set together with detailed instructions on how to integrate it with EVS dataset is available online at http : //www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/W V SIntegratedEV SW V S.jsp?Idioma = I.
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which otherwise would be reduced substantially due to the data limitations. Particularly,
not all the countries where the survey has been carried out have consistently participated
in every wave and the existence of year gaps between different waves creates discontinuity
for the available observation period. Both factors render impossibility to have annual data
from the surveys directly. Even though our method results in no variation of government
preferences for each country in the same decade, practically, it should be of less concern, as
the answers to the survey question are likely to be determined mostly by deeper cultural
convictions or belief system of the society, which on the other hand are not likely to change
dramatically over a relatively short period of time.
Data for all other variables are derived from the World Development Indicators, with the
exception of information on election year and partisan affiliation, which in turn are collected
from the Database of Political Institutions. Summary statistics of all the variables are given
in Table 1.

4 Results
We now turn to the discussion of our empirical results. Specification (9) is estimated by
the system GMM method explained above, along with robust and finite sample corrected
standard errors. The Sargan test and the Arellano and Bond (1991) test are reported at the
bottom of each table, indicating the validity of the instruments used.

4.1 Main Results
Based on both measures of corporate income tax rates (i.e. EATR and SCIT), Table 2
reports the main results from estimations controlling and not for the time trend. For all
four regressions, we find a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the measure of
government preferences in line with Proposition 1 that countries focusing more on economic
development tend to choose a lower level of corporate income tax rate. The magnitudes
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of the coefficients, varying a bit across the definitions of corporate income tax rates and
model specifications, range from -0.14 to -0.23, which implies that a one standard deviation
increase in government preferences toward economic development will be associated with
a reduction in the country’s EATR (SCIT) of around 0.12 (0.19) percent of a standard
deviation. Turning to the effects of country interactions in the setting of tax policies, a
positive and significant effect from the competitors’ weighted tax rates provides evidence on
the existence of tax competition among OECD countries, which in turn is the starting point
of our analysis. It is also noted that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the weighed tax
rates become slightly larger when the primary EATR is used as dependent variable and the
time trend is controlled for, which may reflect the fact that the EATR is a more relevant
measure for the analysis of tax competition. In addition, all four coefficients of weighed tax
rates are smaller than one, which ensures the stationarity of the spatial lag model.
For the other control variables, the lagged dependent variable has a positive and significant coefficient, indicating high persistence of the tax policies. Openness is negatively
associated with tax rates, confirming the fact that higher exposure of a country to trade
and competition for capital tends to reduce tax rates. Government consumption has a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that with higher demand for revenues, a lower
tax rate is chosen in order to attract more tax base. The share of urban population and
unemployment rate are both found to be positively associated with tax rates selected by the
governments, while left wring parties tend to have lower tax rates—particularly on statutory
tax rates. Despite their potential roles in affecting tax rates, the rest of the control variables
are generally not statistically significant in our estimations.

4.2 Robustness
In order to test for the robustness of the main results, we conduct sensitivity analysis along
two dimensions. First, we employ an alternative survey question from the EVS and the WVS
to measure government preferences. More specifically, we use a closely related question on
15

“the public beliefs regarding the fairness of income inequality in a society” taken from the
same survey as an alternative proxy. A number of studies have revealed that the public
beliefs about the causes of income may affect demand and preferences for redistribution
policy. For instance, the more the public perceives wealth and success as the outcome of
luck rather than individual talent and hard work, the more public support for governmental
provision of social equity can be expected. The previous well-known literature, Alesina et al.
(2001) and Alesina and Angeletos (2005b) provide some cross-sectional empirical evidence
supporting this conjecture; they show that a stronger belief in luck as the main determinant
of success is associated with a higher level of redistribution policy (i.e. the share of social
spending in GDP).23 Following these studies, we look at the same survey question from the
EVS and the WVS asking: “In the long run, hard work usually brings a better life. Or
hard work does not generally bring success; it’s more a matter of luck and connections.” The
answers are coded 1 to 10, with 10 indicating the strongest belief in luck. It is expected that
government preferences for income equality are stronger in countries where the mean belief
that luck determines success is higher. Lastly, we follow the exact same method specified in
subsection 3.3 to aggregate the values from individual level to country level. It is also noted
that in order to make it consistent with our primary measure of government preferences, we
rescale this alternative measure to take values from 0 to 1 with larger values indicating weaker
belief in luck as a determinant of success and so favoring more for economic development
policy.
The second method we use as a robustness check is to restrict our estimations to a subsample, which only contains EU-15 countries. The rationale here is that while the differences
in the relative social beliefs and cultures between these countries are smaller, they are geographically closed to each other, which may imply different extents of tax competition among
these countries and so different equilibrium outcomes.
Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results for the alternative measures of government
23

Fong (2001) and Alesina and Ferrara (2005) find a similar pattern using the 1998 Gallup Poll Social
Audit Survey and the General Social Survey respectively for the case of United States.
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preferences and the EU-15 subsample, respectively. As shown, all results are consistent with
our main results obtained above. Furthermore, Table 3 indicates that the effect of government preferences is also comparable in size with this alternative definition. The coefficients of
the weighted EATRs in Table 4 suggest that strategic interactions indeed tend to be stronger
in the EU-15 countries, and the effect of government preferences also becomes larger in this
group of countries. Overall, we find robust evidence to support our main finding that countries with higher preferences for pursuing economic development tend to select lower level of
corporate income tax rates.

5 Concluding Remarks
This paper seeks to provide a novel explanation on the cross-country differences in tax rates,
both theoretically and empirically. We attribute partially the source of this heterogeneity to
the role of government preferences, which are largely simplified in this paper to two important
dimensions: economic development and regional equality. Following the general setups of
the theoretical tax competition literature, we show that as a way to attract more capital
for economic development, countries with a higher preference for economic development in
relative to regional equality tend to select a lower level of capital income tax rate—a result
that is logically in line with the intuition. By using a sample of OECD countries over the
time period 1990-2007, we find supportive evidence for this theoretical prediction, and the
results are shown to be robust across alternative definitions of corporate income tax rates
and government preferences, and across alternative country sample. In addition, we also
provide strong evidence of tax competition pattern among OECD countries, which serves as
the basis for our analysis.
Although there has been some literature on exploring the reasons for the asymmetric tax
policy responses under the context of tax competition, it is hoped that our study will shed
some additional light on this point by highlighting the significance of government preferences.
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For further research in this regard, it would be interesting to see whether our results still hold
with some other possible measures of government preferences, and also whether the results
are robust to other sample sets that may extend to include some developing countries.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable
EATR
SCIT
Pit (primary)
Pit (alternative)
GDP per capita
Openness
Government consumption
Unemployment rate
Urban population
Young population
Old population
Election
Partisan affiliation

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

675
735
480
432
789
786
788
701
810
810
810
788
735

0.273
0.366
0.567
0.540
9.630
0.739
0.186
0.074
0.728
0.208
0.130
0.047
0.416

0.084
0.107
0.071
0.064
0.693
0.436
0.045
0.041
0.115
0.052
0.034
0.212
0.493

Source: Author’s calculations
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Min

Max

0.050 0.488
0.100 0.650
0.363 0.733
0.394 0.665
7.864 10.940
0.160 3.200
0.080 0.300
0.020 0.240
0.430 0.970
0.140 0.440
0.040 0.210
0
1
0
1

Table 2: Government Preferences and Tax Competition: Main Results

τit−1
τ−it
Pit (primary)
GDP per capita t − 1
Openness t − 1
Government consumption t − 1
Unemployment rate t − 1
Urban population t − 1
Young population t − 1
Old population t − 1
Election
Partisan affiliation
Constant
Country fixed effects
Time trend
Observations
Number of countries
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)
Sargan test (p-value)

τ =EATR
(1)
(2)
0.677*** 0.687***
(9.191)
(8.254)
0.371*** 0.404***
(3.832)
(2.599)
-0.140** -0.137**
(-2.414)
(-2.309)
0.004
0.005
(0.889)
(0.890)
-0.014*
-0.014*
(-1.917)
(-1.920)
-0.508*** -0.492***
(-4.141)
(-3.559)
0.205*
0.210*
(1.836)
(1.841)
0.104*** 0.100***
(3.123)
(2.621)
-0.220
-0.198
(-1.109)
(-0.915)
0.243
0.250
(0.851)
(0.865)
0.016
0.016
(1.025)
(1.037)
-0.017*
-0.017*
(-1.825)
(-1.830)
0.052
0.029
(0.861)
(0.271)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
416
416
28
28
0.000
0.000
0.428
0.410
0.304
0.292

τ =SCIT
(3)
(4)
0.617*** 0.615***
(7.254)
(7.060)
0.397***
0.383**
(3.356)
(2.337)
-0.224*** -0.225***
(-2.662)
(-2.664)
0.002
0.002
(0.309)
(0.310)
-0.023** -0.023**
(-2.404)
(-2.374)
-0.718*** -0.724***
(-4.478)
(-4.345)
0.430*** 0.430***
(3.230)
(3.221)
0.142*** 0.144***
(3.375)
(3.235)
-0.109
-0.115
(-0.477)
(-0.492)
0.656*
0.655*
(1.882)
(1.876)
0.016
0.016
(0.792)
(0.797)
-0.035*** -0.035***
(-2.928)
(-2.924)
0.062
0.071
(0.820)
(0.655)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
430
430
28
28
0.000
0.000
0.850
0.851
0.433
0.387

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1990-2007. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Government Preferences and Tax Competition: Alternative Measure of Government
Preferences

τit−1
τ−it
Pit (alternative)
GDP per capita t − 1
Openness t − 1
Government consumption t − 1
Unemployment rate t − 1
Urban population t − 1
Young population t − 1
Old population t − 1
Election
Partisan affiliation
Constant
Country fixed effects
Time trend
Observations
Number of countries
AR(1) (p-value)
AR(2) (p-value)
Sargan test (p-value)

τ =EATR
(1)
(2)
0.694*** 0.706***
(8.024)
(7.925)
0.319*** 0.639***
(3.359)
(3.031)
-0.133
-0.179*
(-1.495)
(-1.879)
0.008
0.010*
(1.530)
(1.762)
-0.019
-0.035
(-0.974)
(-1.570)
-0.480*** -0.360**
(-3.603)
(-2.343)
0.016
0.027
(0.168)
(0.276)
0.102**
0.105**
(2.273)
(2.280)
-0.187
-0.051
(-0.972)
(-0.241)
0.089
0.069
(0.326)
(0.246)
0.004
0.004
(0.858)
(0.787)
0.001
-0.001
(0.270)
(-0.245)
0.040
-0.116
(0.445)
(-0.890)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
369
369
27
27
0.000
0.000
0.623
0.543
0.135
0.254

τ =SCIT
(3)
0.707***
(8.615)
0.125*
(1.650)
-0.207*
(-1.702)
0.008
(1.259)
-0.061**
(-2.470)
-0.386***
(-2.923)
0.084
(0.602)
0.072
(1.446)
-0.065
(-0.288)
0.127
(0.386)
0.026
(1.401)
0.003
(0.325)
0.132
(1.095)
Yes
No
383
27
0.000
0.951
0.134

(4)
0.649***
(7.428)
0.559**
(2.217)
-0.275**
(-2.184)
0.007
(1.118)
-0.091***
(-3.082)
-0.301**
(-2.169)
0.080
(0.576)
0.084*
(1.698)
0.044
(0.190)
0.215
(0.652)
0.025
(1.372)
-0.000
(-0.015)
-0.045
(-0.293)
Yes
Yes
383
27
0.000
0.932
0.152

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1990-2007. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Government Preferences and Tax Competition: EU-15 Countries Sample
τ =EATR
(1)
(2)
τit−1
0.652*** 0.630***
(6.692)
(5.733)
τ−it
0.508*** 0.460**
(2.839)
(2.167)
Pit (primary)
-0.209*** -0.241**
(-3.138)
(-2.427)
GDP per capita t − 1
-0.013
-0.013
(-1.178)
(-1.163)
Openness t − 1
0.007
0.011
(0.560)
(0.702)
Government consumption t − 1
-0.114
-0.131
(-1.065)
(-1.151)
Unemployment rate t − 1
0.046
0.053
(0.500)
(0.569)
Urban population t − 1
0.137*** 0.149***
(2.966)
(2.769)
Young population t − 1
-0.848*** -0.949**
(-2.642)
(-2.384)
Old population t − 1
-0.578*
-0.625*
(-1.732)
(-1.785)
Election
-0.021
-0.021
(-1.319)
(-1.325)
Partisan affiliation
0.000
0.001
(0.047)
(0.186)
Constant
0.357**
0.416**
(2.269)
(1.984)
Country fixed effects
Yes
Yes
Time trend
No
Yes
Observations
224
224
Number of countries
14
14
AR(1) (p-value)
0.000
0.000
AR(2) (p-value)
0.325
0.332
Sargan test (p-value)
0.805
0.757

τ =SCIT
(3)
(4)
0.738*** 0.745***
(8.974)
(8.237)
0.351**
0.373*
(2.244)
(1.953)
-0.183**
-0.169*
(-2.469)
(-1.658)
-0.024*
-0.025*
(-1.740)
(-1.744)
0.013
0.011
(0.943)
(0.632)
-0.083
-0.077
(-0.595)
(-0.546)
-0.037
-0.039
(-0.333)
(-0.348)
0.171*** 0.165***
(3.374)
(2.791)
-0.959*** -0.907**
(-2.835)
(-2.138)
-0.825**
-0.793**
(-2.246)
(-1.983)
-0.004
-0.005
(-0.179)
(-0.202)
0.013
0.012
(1.525)
(1.295)
0.482***
0.453**
(2.733)
(1.982)
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
224
224
14
14
0.000
0.000
0.502
0.498
0.419
0.387

Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. Time period is 1990-2007. Models are estimated by
system GMM estimator. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1, 5, and 10% level, respectively.
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